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T
he 2011 passage of the Victims’ Law raised 
hopes and dreams among Colombia’s 
hundreds of thousands of victims of violence 
and forced displacement. The Victims’ and 
Land Restitution Law, Law 1448 of 2011, sets out 
procedures for reparations and land return for victims 
of violence. According to the minister of justice and 
human rights, the landmark law meant that “the hour 
of the victims has arrived.”1 But two years later, many 
of its beautiful promises remain a distant dream. 
Lutheran World Relief and the Latin America Working 
Group Education Fund conducted field research in 
the Caribbean coast of Colombia in June 2012 and 
again in June 2013 to monitor the implementation 
of the Victims’ Law, particularly its impact on land 
restitution. The law provides for reparations for 
victims since 1985, and land restitution for victims 
displaced since January 1, 1991. It establishes a 
number of new governmental procedures and agencies 
to address the growing number of land claims (see 
Annex on page 24 for a full description of the law). 
We visited the provinces of Atlántico, Bolívar, La 
Guajira and Cesar, where we spoke with victims’ 
associations, poor farmers’ groups, indigenous and 
Afro-Colombian communities, human rights defenders, 
and local and regional government authorities. We 
also interviewed national government officials, U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) officials 
and contractors, and national and international human 
rights and humanitarian agencies. 
The Caribbean Coast is home to the largest number of 
land claims, along with neighboring Urabá. Hundreds 
of thousands of peasants, Afro-descendants and 
indigenous people were forced to flee their land over 
the past twenty years. Guerrilla groups developed a 
strong and abusive presence here; paramilitary groups 
linked to expanding drug trafficking routes emerged 
in the region during the 1980s. Paramilitary groups 
came to control much of the region, establishing close 
networks with business owners, wealthy farmers and 
ranchers, and politicians. Gaining control of extensive 
tracts of land was a central part of their strategy. Their 
successors continue to terrorize the local population, 
particularly targeting land rights activists. 
In our 2012 visit, the Victims’ Law was barely 
beginning to be implemented on the Caribbean Coast, 
as documented in a report, Still a Dream. Even well-
intentioned local government officials interested in 
implementing the law had little direction or resources 
from the national government with which to do so. 
In our 2013 visit, we found that land restitution is 
just beginning to be implemented, but that both land 
restitution and victims’ reparations promised under 
the law are, for most victims, still a distant dream. 
Moreover, whether farmers and communities had 
remained on their land during the conflict, had returned 
on their own initiative without government help, or 
had benefitted from rulings restoring their land under 
the Victims’ Law, they continued to suffer threats, 
harassment and violence from illegal armed actors and 
companies seeking to obtain or use their land. 
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Peace is not only constructed at a negotiating 
table, it is built from the ground up in conflict 
areas. If a just and lasting peace is to be 
created in Colombia, the government must 
figure out how to ensure that victims of violent 
displacement can safely return to their lands. 
That must begin by dismantling the forces 
that caused displacement in the first place. 
Land Restitution Results to Date
From its passage in June 2011 to August 
2013, rulings under the Victims’ Law have 
ordered that 12,658 hectares of land should 
be restored to 371 victims.2 Over 43,500 
claims have been filed;3 less than 1 percent 
of claims filed have been resolved so far. 
Moreover, these 43,500 claims (representing a 
larger number of people, as most are probably 
families) are only a subset of the estimated 
6 million people who were displaced. One 
comparison says it all: Just in 2012, over 
256,000 people were newly displaced from 
their homes by violence. Yet only several 
hundred victims have received a ruling for 
restitution as of August 2013, and very few 
have actually returned home.
Afro-Colombian and indigenous persons, 
who have been disproportionately affected 
by displacement, appear to be undercounted 
in the land restitution registry. No collective 
territories have been included in the land claim 
registry, much less restituted, according to a 
report by Colombian governmental oversight 
agencies. Moreover, only 4.6 percent of the land 
claims have been submitted by claimants who 
identified themselves as indigenous (1.8 percent) 
or Afro-Colombian (2.8 percent). Colombian 
oversight agencies recently issued “a plea for 
the government to prioritize and articulate 
policies that would make possible and real land 
restitution, in particular of collective territories.”4 
Afro-Colombian organizations claim that 
Afro-Colombian and indigenous persons have 
been inadequately represented in the Victims’ 
Roundtables and Transitional Justice Committees 
set up to advise and implement the law.
An analysis of the first 150 land restitution 
sentences indicates that judges are ruling 
decisively in favor of victims; 97 percent of 
these cases received rulings in favor of the 
victims.5 However, Land Unit staff note that the 
first cases moving forward are those with fewer 




























To put in context the slow pace of restitution, 
the Colombian government explains that it took 
over a year to set up the basic institutions to 
implement the Victims’ Law. Implementation 
did not really begin until late 2012. Land 
restitution cases are now certainly moving 
forward, although not at a rate to come 
anywhere near matching new displacements. 
Importantly, the Victims’ Law has been 
accompanied by a land titling program that 
provides title to individual farm families and 
Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities that 
have farmed land without title. The Colombian 
government reports that nearly 63,000 families 
have benefitted from formalization of land titles 
on some 2 million hectares of land from August 
2010 through September 2013.6 While different 
from restitution to displaced persons, this 
program greatly benefits poor farmers and helps 
prevent future displacement.
While the law must be measured against 
tangible results, it is also worth noting that the 
Victims’ Law has contributed in a less tangible, 
but significant way. It has put victims at the 
center of the national debate. Along with the 
efforts by diverse actors such as the National 
Movement of Victims of State Crimes, media 
sources Semana, Verdad Abierta, and Contravía, 
and the Center for Historical Memory set up 
after the paramilitary demobilization, it has 
helped begin to change societal attitudes that 
denigrated or ignored victims of paramilitary 
and state violence. Finally, the Victims’ Law 
likely was a factor that opened the door to 
peace negotiations with the FARC guerrillas. 
But in terms of delivering safe land restitution to 
a broad set of victims of violence, the Victims’ 
Law has barely begun to meet its goal.
The Dangers Facing Land Claimants
Land restitution efforts must take into account 
the high risks facing claimants. Before and since 
the passage of the Victims’ Law, numerous land 
rights activists have been threatened and killed. 
Human Rights Watch has documented 17 cases 
of killings of land rights leaders, in which 21 
people died, since 2008. The Attorney General’s 
office is investigating 49 cases (since 2000) of 
killings of land claimants and leaders in which 
56 people were killed, while the Ombudsman’s 
office states that 71 land rights leaders were 
killed between 2006 and 2011. Government 
data reports that over 500 threats against land 
claimants and their leaders have been made 
just since January 2012.7 
Violence and threats against land rights leaders 
are intended to accomplish one goal: stop land 
restitution. They have a powerful impact that 
goes far beyond the individual leaders and their 
families, undermining communal efforts to 
return home and claim promised rights.
What can the government do to end such 
threats and violence? Most importantly, it can 
effectively investigate and prosecute threats and 
attacks. According to Human Rights Watch, 
the Attorney General’s office has taken a step 




























Las Palmas: Still a Ghost Town
The rural township of Las Palmas is near the municipal seat of San Jacinto. Local leaders note 
that the town was created 150 years ago, when people from San Jacinto, Zambrano and San 
Juan de Nepomuceno arrived there. They remember that a handful of families constructed 
the first houses with palm roofs and walls made of sticks and clay. The town was called Las 
Palmas for the large quantity of iraca, Panama hat palm, in the area.
Las Palmas was a prosperous township, with enormous quantities of avocado, tobacco, corn, 
yucca, and yams grown, as well as cattle ranching. It provided food not only for San Jacinto 
but for Montes de María. Its inhabitants have always been hard-working and entrepreneurial, 
which allowed them to gradually replace the palm, sticks and clay houses with tin roofs and 
brick walls. Many of the sons and daughters of the town, thanks to this hard work, went to 
the cities and entered universities to become professionals. They say with pride that this might 
be the township with the greatest number of professionals in San Jacinto municipality. Las 
Palmas grew to have some 600 houses with 6,000 inhabitants. It had electricity and water, 
and basic health, education, sports and transportation infrastructure. 
But one day, all this changed. The townspeople remember with sorrow September 28, 1999, 
the day when paramilitaries from the Héroes de los Montes de María bloc arrived and accused 

























them of being guerrilla sympathizers. They killed four people in front of everyone, and took 
away others, and the whole town was forced to flee. Everything was abandoned, their harvests 
lost, their animals stolen by the paramilitaries. In time, the houses deteriorated and fell apart. 
Everything ended in the blink of an eye. In total, 19 people were assassinated, and the 600 
families were displaced to San Jacinto, Barranquilla, Cartagena, and Bogotá.
In 2003, three families decided to return to Las Palmas. In 2005 the Bolívar governor’s office 
began to help the return with transport and security. But then FARC guerrillas arrived and 
killed a woman and her son. Once again, the community was terrified, and the families that 
had initiated the return were displaced once more. 
Today Las Palmas has only 60 families in 40 houses, some 150 people left in this once-
prosperous and peaceful community. There is just one teacher for 17 students, and while 
there is a health center, there is no doctor or nurse to serve the community. Along with the 
“palmeros,” as the town’s original inhabitants are known, there are five families displaced from 
other areas who decided to move there. The electrical lines destroyed by the paramilitaries in 
1999 have never been repaired, there is no running water, and the road from San Jacinto is in 
a bad state, despite a large investment in 2011 that the government’s Consolidation program, 
led by the Naval Infantry, supposedly made.
In Las Palmas there are three organizing processes: Asopalma, Asipalma and Nueva 
Esperanza. These are organizations of farmers displaced from Las Palmas, whose objective is 
to assert their rights as victims of the conflict and remind the government of its responsibility. 
These associations, tired of waiting for the government to fulfill its promises for a dignified 
return, organized a march on October 23, 2012 to Bolívar Plaza in Bogotá. They had endured 
13 years of forced displacement. Paula Gaviria, director of the Victims’ Unit, promised them 
that in 365 days, with the help of the Victims’ Unit, they would return.
But a year after this promise was made, the palmeros asked, “How are we going to return? We 
haven’t seen that they have laid a single brick to fix a single house. They have only organized 
workshops for us to remember the past, and we don’t want that.”
Las Palmas remains a ghost town today.
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prosecutors in Bogotá and Medellín who are 
less subject to intimidation, and by beginning 
to use a “contextualized investigative strategy,” 
grouping investigations so that the underlying 
context can provide leads. However, so far “the 
results have been modest: as of August 2013, 
prosecutors had obtained convictions in eight 
of the 49 cases of killings of land claimants 
and leaders” that the Attorney General’s office 
was investigating.8 There are no successful 
investigations of threats against land rights 
leaders, with not a single person being charged 
in any case.9
The government should also increase its 
efforts to dismantle the paramilitary successor 
groups, guerrilla fronts and other forces behind 
the violence. The Santos Administration’s 
peace negotiations with the FARC guerrillas 
could help to at least partially remove 
another armed actor from the conflict. And 
the government has escalated efforts in the 
last couple of years to capture paramilitary 
successor group leadership. But paramilitary 
successor groups remain strong, and linkages 
between these groups and local landowners, 
politicians, and members of the armed forces 
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Pitalito: A Community Returns without Government Help
In Cesar province, the people of Pitalito are determined, but that does not mean they are not 
tired and not afraid. They are, and with good reason. 
Settling in Pitalito in the late 1990s, families farmed and built a small but strong community. 
They organized a junta comunal (community board), sent their children to a small local 
school, and enjoyed access to a basic health center.10
In 2000, their lives were brutally disrupted when paramilitary forces swept through the area, 
killing ten people and forcing the majority of the families to flee, abandoning their land. Pitalito 
was one of many communities across Cesar torn apart by paramilitary violence in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. 
The families of Pitalito lived as internally displaced people under precarious conditions on the 
edge of the small city of Curumaní. In 2003–2004, with few options, they got up the courage 
to return home and begin farming again. Like so many small-scale Colombian farmers, despite 
years of occupancy they never held legal title to their land. In the mid-2000s, they began 
the legalization process with Colombia’s rural land institute, INCODER. While documentation 
indicates that the land was legally titled to a family that eventually sold the land to INCODER, 
thus opening it for titling to the farmers of Pitalito, INCODER responded that the land was a 
forest reserve and as such could not be titled. 
In January 2010, in the middle of sorting out these contradictions with INCODER, a man 
who owns extensive African palm fields arrived at the community claiming to be the legitimate 
owner of lands occupied by 20 families. According to community members, he first arrived 
with ten armed men, wearing military uniforms. The man allegedly went house to house 
pressuring families to sign bills of sale and was armed during these visits. Some families 
agreed to sell to the man at low prices, fearing that they were going to be forced off their land 
if they did not do so. Fourteen families refused to sell, staying on their land. In February, the 
same man returned, allegedly with members of the army, to raze the homes of the remaining 
families. Their homes were destroyed manually and by a tractor, with just the school and one 
or two homes left standing.
Community members turned to local officials, requesting protection and support for their 
titling process. Their requests went unmet, with officials often telling them the case belonged 
to another jurisdiction. In June 2010, community members report that the ESMAD (anti-riot) 
police arrived in Pitalito to evict the remaining families, destroying the makeshift shelters they 
“Fear and panic never abandon us. I have been displaced three times. 
After leaving Pitalito for the first time, I went to a new town, Santa 
Lucia, and the paramilitary leader ‘Cecy’ arrived and killed five farmers, 
threatening the rest of us.”
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had constructed after their homes had been razed. The families that were pushed out included 
30 children and 10 women.
Displaced again, and finding no support from local officials to help them resolve their titling 
case or return to their land, families decided they had no choice but to return on their own. In 
May 2013, 17 families returned to Pitalito, building makeshift homes and planting food crops. 
The return has been arduous, with little food, minimal shelter and with people falling ill from 
contaminated water, forcing children to be hospitalized.
The community is waiting for Pitalito to be categorized as a micro-focalized area and has 
submitted its case to the Land Restitution Unit. The families are now awaiting a response. 
However, until the status of the land as a forest reserve is resolved, the case will likely not 
advance. All the while, the man asserting ownership continues to be an ominous presence, 
as men who work for him are often present taking photos of community members, and noting 
the license plate numbers of lawyers and international accompaniers that visit the community. 
Those leading the land restitution process in Pitalito report that they are often told they will be 
followed and killed if they attend meetings related to land restitution. 
Recently, charges were brought against community members for illegal occupation. Eviction 
orders have been sent, but families refuse to leave. 
Many Colombian families, like those of Pitalito, have chosen to return without state support. 
These communities returning on their own have determined that state-supported returns, and 
the titling process, may never actually take place or will take place long after families have the 
will and the means to return. 
The Pitalito community is an important case in that community members are attempting the 
return at the same time they are seeking formal restitution or land titling. The community is 
supported by national and international accompaniment organizations following their case and 
providing physical accompaniment as a deterrent to violence against their members. 
Most alarming are the continued threats community members face and the lack of protection 
measures available to them, despite the substantial accompaniment the community has 
attracted. “We could end up as false positives,”11 said one community member. “We have to 
be realistic [about the threats]. We take turns sleeping.” 
and police persist. Far too little has been 
done to investigate and prosecute the security 
force members, business leaders, government 
officials and politicians who have benefitted, 
and continue to benefit, from the violence.
Land Restitution in Context
The Victims’ Law is being applied at a time of 
ongoing violence and intense pressure on rural 
communities. As noted, just in 2012, over 
256,000 people were newly displaced from 
their homes by violence.12 Land concentration 
is extremely unequal in Colombia, spurred by 
the so-called “reverse agrarian reform.” Drug 
traffickers and emerging paramilitary leaders 
began buying up land, as a means of money 
laundering and to buy their way into the respect 
of the elite. As many as 6 million hectares 
changed hands from 1985 and 1995.13 Since 
then, violence only accelerated the process. 
USAID reports that “less than 1 percent of the 
population owns more than half Colombia’s 
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best land.”14 Colombia’s GINI coefficient for 
land (which measures land distribution, with 
0 representing total equality and 1 complete 
inequality) is .86, meaning Colombia has one 
of the world’s most unequal distributions of 
land.15 In an effort to halt the violence and 
address the pressing land issue, the Colombian 
government has included land titling efforts 
in a number of their programs, including the 
Consolidation programs that were the successor 
to Plan Colombia.16 These programs, like the 
current restitution initiative, have offered new 
regulations and institutions, but have still had a 
limited impact. 
Despite increasing urbanization, more than 32 
percent of Colombians still live in rural areas.17 
Decades of agricultural policies focused on 
supporting massive agribusiness and export 
programs have also eroded small farmers’ 
abilities to sustain their rural ways of life. 
These issues exploded on the national scene in 
September 2013, when more than three weeks 
of massive agrarian strikes over rural policy, 
including the impact of free trade agreements, 
closed roads throughout the country, left 
thousands of liters of milk rotting outside of 
Bogotá, emptied store shelves throughout the 
country, and resulted in at least 14 protesters 
and 1 policeman killed and hundreds of people 
injured. Any land program aimed at enabling 
victims of Colombia’s violence to return to their 
land must also address the larger issues within 
Colombia’s rural economy.
The Major Obstacle to Restitution
The single greatest obstacle to land restitution 
is that the structures that caused displacement 
have not been fully dismantled, particularly the 
paramilitary successor groups and their allies 
in business, farming, land registry offices, the 
armed forces, and politics. 
Those who cleared land by violence often 
resold the land or turned it over to relatives 
or other third parties, “testaferros.” As the 
land restitution process moves forward, these 
individuals are emerging as “opositores,” 
making a counterclaim to land proposed for 
restitution. They are often well-paid lawyers 
fronting for land speculators, big businesses, or 
the very same criminal paramilitary groups who 
pushed people off the land in the first place. 
Both those who caused displacement and the 
testaferros and others who benefitted from it 
are major sources of the threats and violence 
against land claimants.18
The issue of apparently voluntary land sales has 
plagued the restitution process. Many people 
were forced at gunpoint to sign legal titles and 
in some cases receive minimal payment for 
their land. They were told, “You can sell me 
your land, or your widow can.” The Victims’ 
Law explicitly recognizes that those who 
experienced forced sales deserve restitution, 
but applying this can be difficult. The law offers 
compensation to “good faith” occupants, those 
who purchased the land in good faith from 
those who caused displacement. 
In many cases of opositores, large-scale 
agriculture projects are involved, such as 
intensive ranching and oil palm plantations. 



























companies are trying to use a provision of 
the Victims’ Law, Article 99, so they do not 
have to give up their investments on land 
from which people were displaced. Article 99 
establishes that when an agroindustrial project 
was developed on land to be returned, good 
faith occupants can continue to operate the 
project and create a contract to provide benefits 
to the people who were displaced. Where the 
occupants were involved in the violence, the 
Land Unit will determine who will administer 
the project and ensure victims are benefitted. 
In our visit to the Caribbean Coast, we found that 
large landowners are using the institutions set up 
to implement the Victims’ Law to ask for lifting of 
restrictions on land sales. In areas with massive 
displacement, the Colombian government placed 
a freeze on land sales in order to prevent forced 
sales of land. In Bolívar, Sucre and other regions, 
these freezes are being lifted although pressures 
and threats that generate displacement and 
forced sales still exist.
In all of the areas we visited, large-scale 
economic projects, such as African palm, 
teak, lumber companies, cement, mining, and 
tourism projects are new generators of threats 
and pressures against campesino farmers, and 
indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. 
Companies use heavy-handed means, such 
dividing communities by offering buyouts to 
certain members and putting pressure on 
communities by taking over water sources 
and cutting off market access by blocking 
roads. Another tactic involves setting up 
shell corporations to circumvent limits on the 
amount of designated lands in the hands of a 
single buyer.19 Violence or threats of violence 
continue to be linked to some of these projects; 
companies are hiring ex-paramilitaries as 
security guards, who make threats against 
community leaders; rearmed paramilitaries or 
new criminal groups make death threats, carry 
out assaults, and selective killings, which seem 
to benefit the moneyed interests acquiring land. 
Land restitution and collective titling will not 
be meaningful if communities have no say 
over resource exploitation. The Colombian 
government is approving extensive mining 
concessions on collective territories and other 
lands, including in areas slated for restitution. 
For example, in Arahuaco territory, in the Sierra 
Nevada de Santa Marta, there are dozens of 
mining concessions, some ten tourism projects 
under consideration, and a military base being 
planned, all without adequate consultation of 
the Arahuaco people, according to Arahuaco 
leaders we interviewed.
The Implementers Say:  
We Lack Institutional Capacity
During meetings with government officials 
in Cartagena directly involved in reparations 
and restitution, officials stressed that state 
representatives attempting to comply with 
the current programs faced unwilling partner 
agencies, complex legal processes with serious 
bottlenecks, and insufficient technical capacity. 
victims’ Center. At eight o’clock in the morning, 
the Cartagena Victims’ Center is full of people 
waiting in the heat. These cramped offices 
have practically no office equipment and little 
furniture. Marisela Rios, the coordinator for 
victims’ services, explains that the Victims’ 
Law has raised enormous expectations and 
broadened the universe of victims to whom their 
center needs to respond without the increased 
resources and infrastructure necessary to make 
these promises a reality. 
Her office has not even begun to pay out 
economic reparations under the Victims’ 
Law, as the government has not yet fulfilled 
its obligations to pay out reparations from 
previous laws.
The Victims’ Law requires victims to fill out a ten-
page form, unlike the previous two-pager, and 
this is traumatic for victims, Marisela explains. 
“We then send the applications to Bogotá, and 
they are supposed to evaluate them within 60 
days, and they have a 24-hour team to evaluate 
the claims, but the deadlines are not being met.” 
“What we are giving is small compared to 
what people need.” Marisela explains that the 
center is able to link people to health services 
and to primary and secondary education. But 
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Hacienda Bellacruz: Every Time There Is a Ruling,  
the Threats Increase
The case of the Hacienda Bellacruz is a sad example of the ongoing challenges of return. The 
case demonstrates the deep roots of land conflict, the inability and unwillingness of state 
agencies charged with land issues to enforce their own regulations, and the use of terror 
tactics to prevent farmers from maintaining their subsistence plots.20
The Hacienda Bellacruz was created in the late 1940s, when Alberto Marulanda Grillo 
fenced in thousands of hectares in three municipalities in Cesar (La Gloria, Pelaya, and 
Tamalameque). Campesino leaders have asserted that the Marulanda family violently displaced 
small farmers at the time, some of whom maintained deeds to their land.21 Beginning in the 
1970s, peasant leaders began organizing efforts to regain the land, discovering lands without 
titles not being used for agriculture within the hacienda. In 1986, 64 families began occupying 
these lands, believing that they would soon receive titles from the government’s land agency, 
Incora. The following year, the Ministry of Agriculture (following a request from the Inversiones 
Marulanda Ramirez company) declared the land a forest reserve. In 1988, Carlos Alberto 
Marulanda was named minister of development. 
In April 1994, Incora determined that this land was in fact unlawfully occupied by Inversiones 
Marulanda Ramirez and associated companies, and that these lands should be titled 
to the peasant families. Despite this ruling, Incora announced in 1995 that they would 
purchase approximately 2,000 hectares for distribution to the families occupying the plots. 
Notwithstanding the sale, the peasants never received the titles.
On February 14 and 15, 1996, paramilitary forces under the command of Juan Francisco 
Prada Márquez alias ‘Juancho Prada’22 entered the plots and forcibly evicted 170 families, 
stealing their possessions and burning their houses. One group fled to Bogotá, occupying 
the Incora offices and demanding a government response. Human rights groups backed their 
efforts, despite ongoing accusations of supporting the guerrillas. Multiple agreements between 
peasant leaders, NGO representatives and government officials, including efforts to organize 
verification missions to the region, were unsuccessful. Incora officials reported attacks against 
their agents in the field, including the torture of a driver and threats against topographers 
attempting to carry out the required land survey. By December 1996, more than 30 peasants 
attempting to gain land titles had been killed or disappeared. According to local campesinos, 
farmers who had been tortured and killed, “were decapitated and their heads displayed on 
poles by the side of the road.”23 After a decade of attempting to gain title to their plots, the 
farmers abandoned the land, and the families scattered.
The paramilitary attack—one of hundreds perpetrated against peasant farmers in the region—
gained notoriety in part because the hacienda’s owner, Carlos Alberto Marulanda, by this point 
had been named Colombian ambassador to Belgium, Luxemburg and the European Union. 
Pressure from EU officials and Colombian NGOs resulted in an arrest warrant issued by the 
Colombian government, prompting Marulanda to go into hiding in Europe. After months on the 
run, Marulanda was jailed in Spain and finally extradited to Colombia.24 His brother, Francisco 
Marulanda, was sentenced to 18 years in prison for the displacement in Bellacruz, although 
the family continues to dispute the ruling. 
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In 2010, President Santos declared the case to be “emblematic” of the state’s responsibility 
towards victims of abuses and the need for land restitution. The original 64 families have once 
again presented their claims to the land, now including also the families of the adult children 
of the assassinated peasant leaders, totaling more than 90 families. 
In June, we spoke to leaders of the Bellacruz organizing efforts, and they told us of their 
commitment to the process and the difficulties they face: 
It is very hard to maintain this effort, we are spread out in Barranquilla, Valledupar, Saravena, 
other cities. Each region has a representative because we can’t all get to Valledupar. 
Every time there is a ruling in the case, the threats and attacks increase. On June 3, 2013 I 
had to leave from Aguachica, they threw a bomb at my house, 15 minutes after I had left with 
my family, they almost destroyed my house. There have been so many threats but they have not 
assassinated anyone yet. One compañero was attacked about a month ago but he managed to 
escape. 
I have two bodyguards, I have to run from place to place with an armed guard. There is no 
privacy with such security. You want to live, so you can’t leave them behind. We eight leaders 
always travel together, we have two cars but the economic situation is hard. There has been a 
lot of pressure during the months of April and May, so we decided that it was better to travel 
together, that the enemy would kill one person alone.
Despite the multiple findings in favor of the peasant organizers, the current claimants face 
ongoing challenges. Hacienda Bellacruz has new owners, who claim to have invested millions 
of dollars in planning oil palm.25
According to the peasant leaders documenting the process, Incoder announced in July that the 
land was planted with oil palms, presumably opening the process to a counterclaim based on 
Article 99. In December 2012, the Agustín Codazzi Geographic Institute reported that they 
were unable to locate the boundaries of the disputed plots, given “the transformation of the 
landscape, agricultural production and land cultivation.” 
Restitution to these families who have struggled since 1986 to gain access to their lands 
seems further away than ever. One leader concluded: “We have made 14 declarations to the 
Attorney General, but it all ends up the same. We don’t have enemies, except for the people 
who are affected. They are the ones paying the armed groups. They are throwing bombs so 
that we run away. They are watching our families. I have my children hidden…. We are asking 
for security, because if they don’t attack us, they will attack our families.”
while long-term housing and income-generation 
projects are supposed to be available, in reality 
there is little or nothing. Local governments are 
supposed to complement national resources 
for jobs and housing, but often do not. Even 
emergency humanitarian aid is slow to arrive.
We go next door to talk to victims’ 
representatives, who have been given a small 
storefront by the Victims’ Center. The leaders 
introduce us to a woman whose husband 
was killed in 2000 in the El Salado 
massacre. “I have twice registered my 
claim as a victim, and they say they have 
no record of it.” She is accompanying her 
grown daughter, who came to the center 
today to register, and shows us a small 
scrap of paper on which a date is written. 
Even to just file a claim, she has to return 
in three months’ time.
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Land Unit. The national office and the Cartagena 
regional office of the Land Unit are bustling 
places, with a sense of energy and purpose. 
According to the regional director, Alvaro 
Tapia, the principal challenge facing the Land 
Unit is the disorganized state of the national 
land registry. INCODER, the Agustín Codazzi 
Geographic Institute and the land notary offices 
all have out-of-date and sometimes contradictory 
information about land property coordinates and 
ownership. Tapia draws a series of rectangles 
with overlapping boundaries as he tells us,
The legal process is traumatic. It sounds easy, 
It is listed as one thing, you go to the plot 
and find that none of the boundaries match 
up, everyone has their own version, the 
campesino, Incoder, Agustín Codazzi, us. So, 
what are we supposed to do? We have to do 
what the state should do, we have to do the 
topographical studies. The law says we have 
20 days to do this. What the state hasn’t 
done in 20 years, we have to do in 20 days.
The Land Unit has to prepare documentation for 
each case that includes accurate georeferenced 
information about the land to be restituted. 
“This is a serious bottleneck for our efforts to 
advance land restitution,” notes Tapia.
To date, the 37 cases that have received rulings 
for restitution in this region of the country are 
ones without opposing claims. Land Unit staff 
express concern that the process will slow down 
once more complex cases are in front of the 
judges. Some 3,500 land claims have been 
filed in Bolívar alone. The goal of this regional 
Land Unit is to develop 1500 cases; with thirty 
lawyers, this means a total of 50 cases each. 
Each case involves disputed claims and unclear 
titles with multiple actors, including displaced 
families and current occupiers.
It is difficult to sort out the truth in these 
conflicted claims, asserts Tapia. “Many people 
come in with their claim, I had to leave because 
[paramilitary drug lord] Jorge 40 came, lots 
of people were killed, and then I sold my 
land because I was dying from hunger.” Such 
pressured sales continue today. “These are 
complex situations,” he continues. “Buyers might 
not have been acting in bad faith. In some cases, 
the current owners bought from the people who 
violently displaced others. Who can say?”
According to regional Land Unit staff, in order 
to improve land restitution, it would be helpful 
to have more topographical experts; improved 
land registry information; funding and support 
for victims to travel to identify and help 
georeference their plots; and greater resources 
for judges’ security.
National Land Unit staff also stressed that a 
significant obstacle to land restitution is the 
heavy use of land mines, largely by the FARC, in 
areas slated for restitution. Any land restitution 
efforts must be preceded by careful mapping 
and removal of land mines.
Land restitution magistrates. Two magistrates 
with whom we spoke are committed to 
the restitution process, but frank about the 
challenges they face. These magistrates, 
whose task is to decide the more complex and 
contentious land cases which the land judges 
pass on to them, reported a lack of training on 
law concerning land rights and rural topics in 
Colombia, and the absence of legal precedents 
to follow, given the confusion that exists in 
Colombia’s system of agrarian law. Judges lack 
knowledge of the particular collective rights of 
indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities 
to land, as well as of ways to protect 
collective land rights. The limited number of 
magistrates—only three covering all cases in La 
Guajira, Magdalena, Cesar, Sucre, Bolívar (the 




























Córdoba)—has already led to significant delays 
in the legal processes which will accelerate as 
the number of cases increase. 
The magistrates are very aware of the risks 
facing victims. Placing campesinos in the same 
room with the person who is opposing their 
land claim could put victims in new danger, 
they noted. Providing restitution to single, older 
women in ways that left them isolated could 
be dangerous, and therefore, returning whole 
communities was preferable. 
Finally, the magistrates face their own security 
concerns. While they have some protection 
measures, the measures have yet to be fully 
implemented. The magistrates’ security 
concerns are shared by many others involved 
in the land restitution process. In a March 
2013 letter to President Santos, dozens of land 
restitution judges noted, “The attacks against 
victim claimants, their leaders, and members of 
the organizations that have supported them are 
well know. As justice officials, we are equally 
or even more exposed [to attacks], because we 
are the ones who order the legal and material 
restitution.”26
The Victims Say:  
What Do We Have that Is Real? 
LWR and LAWGEF met with campesino 
organizations, indigenous communities, 
Afro-Colombian communities, human 
rights defenders and humanitarian agency 
representatives, and associations of displaced 
persons in the provinces of Atlántico, Bolívar, La 
Guajira and Cesar in June 2013. We found very 
little impact of the Victims’ Law two years after 
passage. Some of the overall assessments we 
heard were harsh indeed:
➤ “After two years, we can’t see any victim 
who has been served by it. No one is 
receiving reparations here.”  
– victim of the El Salado massacre
➤ “Last year we saw the Victims’ Law as 
a hope. We got involved in the Victims’ 
Roundtable. But then we started getting 
threats.”  
– community leader from Carmen de Bolívar
➤ “What is their game with this law? The 


























Mampuján: Restitution and Reparations Advance,  
but Unequally
The small settlement of Mampuján, tucked into the lowland jungle along the coast, is showing 
signs of progress. As we talked to the community leaders, however, even this best-case 
scenario revealed the significant challenges ahead as these small farmers attempted to return 
to their land.
The entire community of more than 300 families—the vast majority Afro-Colombians—
was forced to flee their land after a paramilitary incursion in early 2000 in which all were 
threatened and eleven killed. After more than a decade of waiting, this case was the first 
ruling of the controversial Justice and Peace process. Paramilitary leaders27 of the Montes de 
María bloc of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) were sentenced to pay 1500 
minimum wages, and their civil rights were suspended for 20 years, but despite being found 
guilty of crimes against humanity, as per the law, they were only sentenced to 8 years in 
prison. The family members of those killed were awarded 40 million pesos each in damages, 
with the displaced awarded 17 million each. 
Mampuján community leaders sued the 
government, however, arguing that the 
punishments and the compensation were 
inadequate.
The Mampuján community also made news 
when they received the first land restitution 
ruling in the country in October 2012. 
Fourteen families received rights to 65 
hectares of land in the first case decided by 
specialized land restitution judges. The case 
was one of the least controversial: after the 
displacement, no one occupied the land, and 
there was no “opositor” in the legal process.
Those who received the land are thrilled to 
have it back, although they are still traveling 
to their plots each day to farm while living in 
“new” Mampuján. During our visit, one elderly 
gentleman in glasses and short brimmed hat, 
with the thin wiry build of life-long work in 
the fields, smiled widely as he described his 
happiness. He is growing corn now, after so 
long unable to farm. His shirt expressed his 
gratitude: with Land Unit’s logo and a slogan, 
“Thank you, Mr. President.” 
Yet even this case exposes the complications 
faced by such communities. Leaders 











the settlement, with some who received titles now the employers of others. “We have 1400 
people in this community,” explains a community council member. “And the Victims’ Law only 
covers those who are linked to the land. Only 76 families were property owners [at the time 
of displacement], and so far 43 families have received restitution.” The community council is 
attempting to use other government programs and laws to benefit more community members. 
The leaders complain the number of judges is insufficient given the high quantity of land 
restitution cases. As a result, long delays plague the process. Requests from last year for 
further restitution have not been resolved, despite the six-month deadline.
Complex ownership histories complicate efforts to establish restitution. As one community 
leader told us, 
The law will violate some people’s rights. If a judge is confronted with a situation where I had to 
leave, and I sell my land, and if the new owner has the land for ten years and then has to leave 
and tries to sell that land, what will the judge do in that case? Who is going to get the right to 
return? And what will happen to the other owners? The judges are going to end up violating 
someone’s right—or everyone’s. The intention is good, but the law is not enough. What we need 
is a land reform program that will provide equitable land distribution.
Despite these challenges, community leaders stress that they are working to remain united. 
Their vision is expressed in one of the elaborate embroidered quilts made by the women’s 
organization as part of their memory project. While some of the quilts portray the events of 
the massacre and other tragic events, the largest contains multiple scenes of a small rural 
community. The women point out each moment captured in the quilt: children swimming in 
the river while their mother washes clothes, families working together in the fields, a couple 
heading to church while children play outside the school house in their uniforms, elders 
resting under shade trees. “We are trying to be patient, not to be jealous of what our neighbor 
has. We are recognizing the challenges that others face.”
municipalities, the local ombudsman’s 
offices don’t work together. The regional 
ombudsman’s office is a mess. Nowhere is 
the voice of the victim heard. There is not 
a real commitment of the state with the 
victims. Santos says these things, but there 
is not an institutional commitment.”  
– accompanier of communities in Bolívar/Sucre
➤ “We have been victims for thirteen years, 
and since then we have heard blah blah 
blah, a series of lies and laws. About this 
latest law… What do we have that is real? 
So much deception.” 
– campesino leader, Montes de María 
➤ “Government aid is like the World Cup. It 
arrives just once every four years.”  
– indigenous leader from La Guajira, commenting 
on governmental emergency aid for the displaced
➤ “There are thousands of victims’ claims, 
but the institutional response is ‘operation 
tortoise.’” 
– human rights defender, Barranquilla
In many regions, victims found themselves having 
to explain the law to uninformed or uninterested 
local authorities. In María La Baja, according to 
a community member, the local ombudsman is 
refusing to take testimony. “I have tried to get 
him to take my testimony, but he refuses. We 
have tried to go to the ombudsman of Cartagena 
instead. We had only two meetings of the 
Victims’ Roundtable last year, and now they 
have gone for almost a year without meeting. 
We had better deliver the law to them [local 
officials], because they have no idea.” María La 
Baja was the scene of multiple home invasions 
and rapes in 2011. “Terrible things happen in 
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María La Baja, and victims are scared to talk.” 
In another community, victims are “taking our 
own census and then will try to get the Victims’ 
Unit to come here, if the ombudsman won’t do 
what he is supposed to do.” In a municipality 
in Cesar, “the personero [local ombudsman] 
doesn’t know how to fill out the forms for land 
restitution. Doesn’t do anything to describe how 
to use the Victims’ Law or restitution. No one 
says anything.”
Beyond the state’s technical problems and lack 
of institutional support, land claimants also 
report that state agencies—particularly on the 
local level—have been coopted and occupied 
by the paramilitary criminals who caused 
displacement. Indeed, in many areas, the very 
institutions set up to help catalyze and monitor 
the implementation of the law, forums in which 
victims are intended to be central or to have 
a voice, are not functioning, or worse, are not 
safe spaces for victims. In areas such as Cesar, 
Bolívar and Sucre, some of the institutions and 
government officials involved in the Victims’ 
Roundtables and Territorial Transitional Justice 
Committees (CTJTs)—mayors, governors, 
prosecutors, INCODER agents, ombudsmen—
are known to community members as 
connected to paramilitary groups and as having 
been involved in displacement and the legalizing 
of land titles obtained by violence. 
There are slots for only a couple of victims’ 
representatives in the CTJTs, and victims then 
face an often intimidating array of civilian 
government and public security forces. A 
number of people reported having received 
threats after attending Victims’ Roundtables or 
CTJT meetings. One displaced person raised 
a land claim in the Victims’ Roundtable and 
the next day received a threatening phone 
call. A woman was threatened after attending 
a discussion of the victims’ “participation 
protocol” intended to increase victims’ 
participation in applying the Victims’ Law. In 
one area, the Victims’ Unit itself was believed 
to be filtering information about land claimants 
to large landowners. An INCODER official was 
reported to have made a statement interpreted 
as a threat against a land claimant’s children 
(“You are up against powerful interests here,” 
the INCODER agent said. “And you leave 
your children at home alone?”). In another 
case, a victim found that the other victims’ 
representative in the CTJC was involved in his 
displacement. “There aren’t guarantees in the 
Victims’ Roundtables,” said a campesino leader. 
“The victims are there with the perpetrators. 
We need international accompaniment because 
there are no guarantees for us in these spaces.”
The Colombian government’s position is that 
victims do not require lawyers or advocates 
to claim reparations and restitution, and the 
Victims’ Law explicitly caps lawyers’ fees with 
the stated intention of protecting victims from 
abuse. But those filing counterclaims often have 
pricey lawyers, and victims and human rights 
group repeatedly told us that they felt without 
support and in danger as they participated 
in Victims’ Law mechanisms and made their 
land claims. According to one human rights 









The women’s cooperative quilt shows how armed paramilitary 
forces invaded Mampuján.
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are leaving a victim to go face-to-face with a 
landowner or a mayor.”
A Province at risk: Cesar. In Cesar, the 
situation of land claimants is dire. A number 
of communities hoping to receive restitution, 
or returning without benefit of government 
help, banded together in February 2013 as the 
Campesino Assembly of Cesar in Favor of Land 
Restitution and Good Life. “From one moment 
to the next,” said one claimant, “we can meet 
with death. Here in Cesar, the governor’s 
office, the social welfare institute, INCODER, 
the prosecutor’s office, all the institutions had 
links [to the paramilitaries]. We are asking for 
protection, for investigations, but they laugh at us 
here. They say we are behind our own threats.” 
At the time of our visit, only one community 
in Cesar had received a ruling for their land 
to be restituted, some thirty families in Toco, 
San Diego municipality. The community’s 
leader is in grave danger and was the victim 
of an attempted attack in April. While he has 
a protection scheme, his protection is not 
adequate, and the threats against him are not 
effectively investigated.
According to a staff member of the 
Ombudsman’s office in Cesar, “The guarantees 
for those of us involved in defense of territory 
are minimal, we are converted into military 
targets. Constitutional Court orders are 
important, but little is carried out in reality. 
All the leaders in the Victims’ Roundtables are 
threatened. A grenade was thrown into my 
house in May.” Her husband is a human rights 
leader of the Wiwa indigenous people.
One community leader told us, “I know every 
day I am at risk. After I visit the prosecutor’s 
office, more threats. Everyone pulls away from 
me because of fear. You look at the authorities, 
and you remember, wasn’t this one a para?”
A displaced leader from Hacienda Bella Cruz 
(page 10) said, “We have received many threats 
from the Anti-Restitution Army and others, 
pamphlets, phone calls. Every time we work 
with INCODER, more threats. We have presented 
14 complaints to the prosecutor’s office, and 
we are asking them to group them together. 
They usually look at them separately and then 
close them one by one for lack of proof. I have 
protection measures, two bodyguards from the 
Interior Ministry. But in the end what we want is 
not security schemes, but for the government to 
remove the paramilitary presence.” 
mampuján: Some Light Ahead. Only in 
Mampuján, where we reported little progress last 
year, do we now see some vision, though still 
limited, of how things could begin to improve 
(page 14). Entering “new” Mampuján, we are 
met by an old man. Beaming, he says that yes, 
he is one of the people restituted. He now has 
several hectares, planted with corn and other 
crops. “After so many years of being displaced, 
so many years when I could grow nothing, 
now look at what I have.” And throughout new 
Mampuján, there are the signs of construction, 
new houses, community projects.
But it is complicated here too. Mampuján 
benefitted from one of the few settlements from 
the Justice and Peace law, and was singled out 
as a priority case by the national government, 
so it is not typical. Community members are 
astutely using all laws and mechanisms at 
their disposal, of which the Victims’ Law is 
only one, in order to recover land and generate 
small-scale development. They express concern 
that the variety of governmental programs 
to help victims end up dividing victims and 
communities. And perhaps most importantly, 
their process did not face opposition.
Challenges in Implementation
Challenge one:  
Providing real Protection
Land return without safety is a cruel mockery. 
Creating real safety starts with three 
commitments: serious efforts to dismantle the 
paramilitary, BACRIM, and guerrilla groups that 
continue to generate violence, and to prosecute 
the members of state security forces, politicians, 
businesses and government officials who 
support, finance or tolerate them; investigating 
and prosecuting police and military members 
who commit abuses; and effectively investigating 
and prosecuting threats and attacks against 
communities and land rights leaders. 
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A Dream Delayed: Collective Titles for Afro-Colombian 
Communities in and around Cartagena
Presidents Santos and Obama handed out land titles to Afro-Colombian communities 
Palenque and La Boquilla after the April 2012 Summit of the Americas in Cartagena. The 
high-profile ceremony was accompanied by rockstar Shakira. 
It was supposed to be the first of many such collective land titles granted to the Afro-
Colombian communities surrounding Cartagena, as well as throughout Colombia. These 
Cartagena communities on the beaches and islands surrounding Cartagena have lived, fished, 
farmed, and maintained their culture and collective organizations on these lands for decades 
or centuries—without title.
Over a year and a half later, 
not a single of the 25 other 
Afro-Colombian communities 
in the Cartagena area has 
received title. This titling is 
not part of the Victims’ Law—
these communities are not 
displaced—but rather a long-
delayed implementation of Law 
70, which is intended to ensure 
collective titles to Colombia’s 
Afro-Colombian communities. 
The Santos Administration 
has promised to speed up 
titling to indigenous and Afro-
Colombian communities as 
well as individual land titling to 
campesinos.
USAID has had the goal of assisting some of the Afro-Colombian communities in and around 
Cartagena in applying for their collective titles. But after the rush job of readying La Boquilla 
and Palenque in time for the summit, the process remains unaccountably stalled.
In our conversations with Afro-Colombian community leaders, we found that tourism 
businesses, such as the huge hotels all over Cartagena’s waterfront, as well as a naval base, 
seeking to expand their landholdings, present a significant obstacle. They have placed political 
pressure on INCODER and used their influence to divide communities. Afro-Colombian 
community leaders in favor of collective titling are trying to persuade their membership of 
its value, while outside interests coveting land valuable for tourism have sought to persuade 
individual Afro-Colombians that they will lose the right to sell (a right they do not in any case 
have now, as most have no title, whether individual or collective).
But the community division does not fully explain the lack of progress. There seems to be a 
tremendous lack of political will on the part of the national and municipal governments to 
accomplish this. 





























The problems do not stop at collective land titling. Communities need help investing in 
productive projects—fishing, farming where land permits, artisanry, and other projects. Dr. 
Benjamin Luna, president of the La Boquilla community council, asserts that communities, 
through their community councils, must be the ones to choose the kind of development 
projects they wish to pursue. He stresses that donors such as USAID or the Colombian 
government should not force their views on communities regarding what kind of development 
path they should follow.
Says Dr. Luna, “We have to find a balance between these tourism megaprojects and our 
existence. We can do it. There needs to be strengthening of community councils. Second, we 
need collective titles for all of the communities. Then, we need training so people can work in 
the tourism industry.” 
“The Afro people in Cartagena will continue to call for recognition, not just on paper nor just in 
symbolic acts, of our fundamental human rights to our free territory, with autonomy, rights and 
authority, [so we can be] the leaders and implementers of our own ethno-development,” explains 
Gustavo Balanta Castilla, the director of Fundación Surcos and member of the Agenda Caribe 
network. Public shows of Colombian and U.S. governmental support for Afro-Colombians in 
Cartagena, according to Mr. Balanta, should not remain just “pura boquilla,” empty rhetoric.28 
Even with titles, it will be a challenge for Afro-Colombian communities to contend with the 
pressures of the hotel and tourism industries that are expanding into the beaches, islands and 
mangrove swamps in and near their lands. But without titles, they are far more vulnerable.
Beyond delivering on those overall 
commitments, the government must design 
local prevention and protection plans with 
the full participation of returning and returned 
communities. Protection plans may identify a 
mix of needs and solutions, including greater 
presence of a local ombudsman, removing a 
corrupt official, developing risk maps, providing 
cell phones if coverage is available, investing in 
community-based rural development projects, 
fixing a bridge or road to provide easier access, 
electrification, and of course properly legalizing 
land titles. Protection does not necessarily 
come from security force presence, although a 
protection plan may include security measures 
such as police or army patrolling around the 
perimeters of the community in a manner which 
does not prejudice the principle of distinction 
under international humanitarian law.29 These 
plans must outline the responsibilities of specific 
government agencies. The Inspector General’s 
office should monitor compliance with these 
plans to ensure accountability.
Protection for rural communities and land rights 
leaders is different than protection for urban 
human rights defenders. One bullet-proof car 
does not protect a community or protect a 
leader in an area where rivers are transport, and 
bullet-proof vests are unworkable in hot climates. 
Protection that is more collective and addresses 
root causes of violence is more of an answer in 
rural areas, and often in urban, as well.
Prevention and protection programs should 
ensure that civil society’s own collective 
protection programs that distance the civilian 
population from the conflict should be respected 
and protected. These include humanitarian 
zones of refuge, planes de salvaguardia, and 
planes de vida. The Ministry of Defense, 
Ministry of Interior, and National Protection Unit 
should instruct the army and police to respect, 
rather than undercut, these initiatives.
Challenge Two:  
Increasing Local Government’s Political Will 
The Victims’ Law, or any similar law or program 
to benefit victims, simply will not work without 
the buy-in and political will of local government. 
Without political will among governors, mayors, 
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and city council members, as well as among 
the local representatives of national institutions, 
such as local and regional level prosecutors, 
ombudsmen and INCODER officials, not only 
will these mechanisms fail to deliver, they can 
be turned against victims. How to create this 
political will is no easy challenge.
President Santos has emphasized the 
importance of the Victims’ Law through his 
speeches, media and public events. Each 
leader of the chief institutions involved in 
implementing it need to do the same, including 
the Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Defense 
and the Attorney General, and they must 
mobilize the resources of their institutions 
behind the law. The Ombudsman and 
[Inspector General lead institutions particularly 
critical to defending victims’ rights, and they 
must use their offices far more effectively to 
become a real force for victims’ rights at a 
local, regional and national level.
But positive incentives are not enough. At the 
core of the resistance to land restitution and 
reparations is the deadly link between local 
civilian and security officials and illegal armed 
groups and companies willing to use any means 
to acquire land and profits. Investigating and 
prosecuting corrupt and abusive politicians, 
INCODER officials and land notaries, 
businesses, and police and military members 
will pave the way not just to implement laws 
in favor of victims, but to establish the good 
governance Colombia deserves.
Challenge Three:  
national Institutions and resources
The Victims’ Law replaces a whole set of existing 
government institutions that provide assistance 
to victims. As one indigenous leader noted, the 
government’s social programs are “chameleons,” 
continually changing color, changing names. This 
constant change creates a maze of programs, 
more red tape, and many opportunities to 
actually help victims are lost. The government 
must maintain greater consistency with programs 
serving victims, ensure that national and local 
government agencies coordinate with these 
institutions, and put adequate resources behind 
their lofty missions.
Challenge Four:  
victims’ Participation
The Victims’ Law will only function if all levels 
of government involved in implementation 
actually listen to victims. The law is designed 
with some thoughtful measures intended to 
give victims a voice, and when it became clear 
these were not being implemented, a “Protocol 
for Effective Participation of Victims of the 
Armed Conflict,” Resolution 388 of May 2013, 
was developed with input from victims. This 
spells out the full range of victims who must be 
invited to participate in Victims’ Roundtables 
at a local, regional and national level. It has 
some important accountability mechanisms, 
such as ensuring that the Roundtables can 
review and make recommendations for local, 
regional and national action plans for carrying 
out the Victims’ Law, and that local, regional, 
and national authorities must present reports 
on their programs and explain whether these 
recommendations have been adopted.
However, making this work at a local, regional 
and national level is still an enormous 
challenge. The first obstacle, especially at the 
local level, is that these forums for participation 
are not even safe spaces for victims. The 
Colombian government must make an example 
of investigating and prosecuting effectively 
the threats that have arisen surrounding the 
Victims’ Roundtables and CTJTs. The national 
government must exhort local and regional 
authorities to create safe and functional spaces 
for victims to be heard. 
The participation protocol indicates the important 
role of the Ombudsman’s and Inspector 
General’s office in these spaces, as personeros 
are intended to play a role as conveners. While 
there are many remarkable and brave personeros 
throughout Colombia, there are others who are 
corrupt or timid. The Ombudsman’s Office must 
play a stronger leadership role here. 
Challenge Five:  
economic Sustainability
Once land is slated for return, farmers receive 
a certain amount of funding in a bank account 
which can be released for the productive project 
of their choice. While this is a good incentive, it 
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is far from a comprehensive measure to ensure 
economic sustainability. The government needs 
to deliver on the services that it should provide to 
the countryside, with or without a Victims’ Law: 
roads, affordable agricultural credit, extension 
services, technical assistance for marketing, 
as well as schools, health clinics, and courts. 
These rural development programs for returned 
communities should be coordinated by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and consulted with the 
communities they are intended to benefit.
Many displaced persons owed debts at the time 
of displacement. These debts mounted during 
the years that they were displaced. The Victims’ 
Law permits the Land Unit to create programs 
to cancel taxes owed by displaced persons and 
renegotiate debts, but it simply allows this, it 
does not mandate it or provide the funding to 
carry it out. The government must ensure that 
returning families and communities start with a 
clean slate, free of debt. 
Land restitution that is concentrated in 
communities, rather than returning a family 
here, a family there, makes sense in terms of 
economic sustainability as well as protection. 
The government can then direct services to a 
whole community.
Finally, the Colombian government should 
recognize that land restitution is taking place 
at a moment in which small-scale farmers are 
under particular risk from the implementation 
of free trade agreements, including the U.S.-
Colombia free trade agreement. Measures to 
cushion small-scale farming from the impact of 
these trade agreements are necessary.
Challenge Six:  
Protection of Campesino Agriculture 
and Indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
Communities from Large-Scale economic 
Projects
To have real sustainability, there must be 
protection of campesino agriculture—small-scale 
farming—and Afro-Colombian and indigenous 
communities from the pressures, legal and 
illegal, exerted by mining companies, palm 
plantations, tourism projects, and many other 
large-scale economic projects. Establishing real 
mechanisms for meaningful prior consultation on 
all such development projects in indigenous and 
Afro-Colombian communities is one step. The 
agreement by the Colombian government and the 
FARC to create “campesino reserve zones,” in 
essence, areas zoned for small-scale agriculture, 
could be another important mechanism. The 
Colombian government must place greater 
priority on small-scale agriculture if land return is 
to be sustainable.
Challenge Seven:  
options for the many Who Want to remain 
in Cities
The majority of displaced persons and refugees 
and their children will choose to remain in cities. 
Land restitution is not a viable option for them. 
Improved and expanded programs for income-
generation, education, housing and community 
development so that displaced families can 
rebuild their lives in urban areas are essential. 
Challenge eight:  
moving towards Truth, Justice and 
Guarantees of nonrepetition
The Victims’ Law is focused primarily on 
reparations and land restitution, offering little 
new in the way of truth, justice and guarantees 
of nonrepetition. The hard task of making 
justice work and creating the kind of state 
that actually protects citizens from violence 
still lies ahead. Taking real steps to dismantle 
paramilitary, guerrilla and other illegal armed 
groups, including by prosecuting the politicians, 
security forces, businesses and government 
officials that support them, is of paramount 
importance. Ensuring grave abuses by the 
state’s own security forces are prosecuted in 
civilian courts is another step. Strengthening the 
protective power of civilian government agencies 
in the countryside is essential. And the peace 
negotiations in Havana could deliver relief from 
violence if the FARC demobilizes, and a healing 
measure of truth if the parties agree to an 
independent truth commission. 
The Victims’ Law, even if implemented fully, 
is only the start of what the Colombian 
government, with assistance from the 




FOR THE COLOMBIAn GOVERnMEnT:
To implement the victims’ Law and land titling:
n Implementing the Victims’ Law will be an exercise in futility unless more progress is made in 
preventing future displacement. The government must take a more vigorous approach to dismantling 
illegal armed groups, particularly paramilitary successor groups, including by disciplining, 
investigating and prosecuting members of the army, police and local officials that aid, abet or tolerate 
them, and the landowners and companies that employ them to coercively expand landholdings. 
Achieving a peace agreement with strong measures for truth and justice with the FARC guerrillas, as 
well as a future agreement with the ELN, will also contribute to reducing displacement.
n Encourage local authorities to vigorously implement the Victims’ Law. This should include requiring 
local governments to conduct broad outreach to victims’ organizations representative of victims in 
the local area; to be responsive to the recommendations of victims’ organizations in drawing up 
plans for implementation; and to include such plans and their budgets in municipal and regional 
development plans. The national government should provide adequate resources to municipal 
governments and victims’ attention centers to apply the law, above and beyond the resources 
already available to displaced persons.
n Take decisive steps to ensure that the forums created for victims’ participation such as the Victims’ 
Roundtables and CTJCs are viable spaces in which victims feel they can safely speak up and in 
which their perspectives are respected and have an impact. The Ombudsman’s Office should 
issue instructions and ensure that its representatives actively work to achieve this goal. Any 
threats or attacks against victims participating in these spaces must be investigated promptly and 
appropriate protection issued immediately.
n Ramp up provision of legal advice and accompaniment to victims for land restitution and 
reparations via the Ombudsman’s office, local personeros, and nongovernmental organizations. 
Expanded partnerships with nongovernmental organizations with experience in accompanying 
victims and communities at risk would help to accomplish this goal.
n Provide immediate and effective protection for all land restitution judges and magistrates.
n Monitor land restitution units, judges, INCODER agents, notaries and Territorial Transitional 
Justice Committees to ensure that they are not being coopted by those who benefited from stolen 
land. The Attorney General’s office and Inspector General’s office should investigate, discipline, 
prosecute and dismiss corrupt officials.
n Continue and expand the collective titling of land which is currently occupied by Afro-Colombian 
and indigenous communities, as well as the individual titling of campesino land. In many areas, 
such as the Afro-Colombian communities in and near Cartagena, these processes appear stalled 
and renewed efforts must be made to accelerate titling.
To ensure that restitution and titling creates sustainable livelihoods:
n Prioritize rural development investments in restitution areas. To ensure sustainable development, 
investments must be made in return areas and be integrated into local and regional development 
plans where they exist. Supporting each returning family individually, monetarily or with technical 
support, has its place but will not result in strong rural regional economies in which families 
and communities play an active role. Scaling up investments by focusing on entire communities 
or groups of returning families and integrating investments into existing regional development 
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initiatives is the only path to sustainable development in restitution areas and the best approach 
for ensuring returning families are able to stay on their land and benefit from their farming 
investments. 
n Investments should prioritize the strengthening of and creation of farming associations. Strong 
associations can facilitate farmers’ access to credit, increase their access to new markets 
and decrease the cost of inputs. Investments in associations should prioritize organizational 
strengthening, the creation of business plans, training in new farming techniques, and support 
to access credit, connect to financial institutions, carry out market studies and increase farmers’ 
control over the value chain of their products. Support for associations does not need to be tied to 
one product but rather focus on fostering strong organizations and enhancing members’ capacity to 
manage and gain from the value chains of various products. 
n Efforts must be made to support collective returns for female heads of households and widows. 
Collective returns should be accompanied by investments in women’s associations, allowing 
“returning” women greater opportunity to benefit from their land through agricultural and business 
endeavors.
n Attention to resource management is necessary to make farming endeavors sustainable, particularly 
in the face of climate change. Investments in agriculture for returning families should emphasize 
climate-smart agriculture, creating conditions that allow families to produce food, engage in local 
and regional markets and protect natural resources. There are models of climate-smart agriculture 
investments being made in Colombia by international and local nongovernmental organizations which 
provide important examples. 
n Securing collective land title for Afro-Colombian communities is essential, yet titling must be 
accompanied by investments in agriculture systems to enhance food security and increase 
earnings. Investments must be consulted with and agreed to by communities and must include 
technical support and the development of business plans designed by communities and aligned 
with communities´ development priorities and training. 
To ensure protection for returned and returning communities:
n The Attorney General’s office should prioritize effective investigations and prosecutions of threats and 
attacks against land rights leaders and returned and returning communities. It should focus efforts on 
areas where land restitution efforts are taking place. 
n Provide effective protection to returned and returning communities at risk, designing prevention 
and protection plans in close consultation with communities. Protection should be extended 
whether communities are returning via the Victims’ Law or on their own initiative. Local protection 
plans may identify a mix of solutions, including investigations into threats and attacks, greater 
presence of a local ombudsman, creating risk maps, or removal of a corrupt official. They may 
include a fixed bridge or road, electrification, cellphones and transport. Plans may also include 
investing in community-based rural development projects and legalizing land titles. Communities 
may call for army or police patrolling around area perimeters in a way that does not put them at 
risk. Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities require a differential focus. There is no one-size 
fits all solution; the only workable solutions are those designed collectively by communities.
n As part of these prevention and protection plans, the Ministry of Interior should establish and 
local authorities should implement an emergency reaction protocol in order to engage civilian 
government authorities, police and military and hold them accountable for their obligations to 
provide 24-hour, urgent protection to returned and returning communities and land rights leaders. 
The Early Warning System’s risk reports should be made public and disciplinary sanctions should 
be issued if its warnings are disregarded by local authorities or military officials.
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AnnEX:  
The Victims’ and Land Restitution Law 
What Does the Law Say?
The Victims’ and Land Restitution Law (Ley de 
Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras), Law 1448 
of 2011, sets out procedures for reparations 
and land return for victims of violence. 
Reparations are to be provided to those who 
became victims after January 1, 1985, while 
land restitution is only provided for those who 
were displaced since January 1, 1991. Those 
who became victims prior to 1985 still have 
the right to the truth, symbolic reparations and 
guarantees of non-repetition, or the assurance 
that such abuses will never occur again. 
Significantly, victims of Colombia’s armed 
forces, as well as of guerrillas and paramilitary 
groups, are included.
Law 1448 is to be in effect for ten years. The 
law’s application will be “gradual,” “progressive,” 
and financially “sustainable,” thus giving the 
government leeway to apply it gradually.
n Civil society’s own collective protection programs should be respected and protected, including 
humanitarian zones of refuge, planes de salvaguardia, and planes de vida. The Ministry of 
Defense and Ministry of Interior should instruct the army and police to respect, rather than 
undercut, these initiatives. 
FOR THE U.S. GOVERnMEnT:
n Condition assistance for the Victims’ Law on greatly improved actions to protect returned and 
returning communities and land rights leaders. Plans must be designed and implemented with the 
full participation of affected communities. 
n Urge the Colombian government, using the leverage of human rights certification, to take a much 
more vigorous approach to dismantling paramilitary successor groups and investigating and 
prosecuting the army and police members and local officials that aid, abet and tolerate them, as 
well as the landowners and companies that may employ them. Without such vigorous action by 
the State Department, USAID’s support for implementing the Victims’ Law cannot succeed.
n Provide assistance for prevention and protection programs for communities and land titling. 
Provide increased legal accompaniment for victims via the Ombudsman’s Office, personeros 
and nongovernmental human rights organizations with experience in accompanying victims and 
communities at risk. Carefully monitor these programs with input from victims’ associations and 
human rights groups to ensure they benefit the intended population. Fund and work with existing 
campesino, Afro-Colombian, indigenous and victims’ organizations rather than creating new ones, 
and ensure funding unites, not divides, communities and social movements.
n Under these conditions, continue assistance to strengthen the Victims’ Unit and Land Unit. Target 
assistance for Victims’ Law implementation to bottlenecks and needs not provided by other donors, 
as for example topographers to help prepare cases for land restitution judges. Encourage and 
support assistance via governmental and nongovernmental channels for sustainable economic 
development for returning communities, designed in consultation with those communities. 
n Urge much greater progress by INCODER in meeting goals for collective titling for Afro-Colombian 
and indigenous communities, in close consultation with these communities, and ensure USAID 
contractors are effectively contributing to meeting these goals.
n Support as needed land mine surveys and removal, land mine education programs, and assistance 
to land mine survivors.
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An innovative element of the law is the “good 
faith principle,” under which the government 
presumes that the victim is telling the truth. 
The burden of proof is not on the victim, and 
the victim receives the benefit of the doubt. 
To guard against abuse, there are penalties for 
falsely claiming victimhood. 
The law refers to the victims’ rights to truth, 
justice, and nonrepetition. It creates a National 
Day of Remembrance and Solidarity with 
Victims, April 9th, and establishes a Center of 
Historical Memory. However, there is little in 
the way of substantive, new mechanisms or 
institutions for truth, justice and nonrepetition. 
The core of the law is reparations and land 
restitution.
reparations and Services. The law requires 
emergency humanitarian aid and transitional 
assistance for internally displaced persons, 
essentially continuing and reinforcing the state’s 
existing responsibility to provide programs for 
the displaced. Many services the law references 
are the normal services that the government 
would be obligated to supply in any case, such 
as basic health and primary education. Victims 
are to receive priority access to public higher 
education, housing programs, and a number of 
other government services. Victims also receive 
monetary compensation according to the crime 
suffered. For example, close family members 
of a murdered victim would receive up to 40 
minimum monthly salaries while someone who 
was tortured would receive up to 30 minimum 
monthly salaries. 
The law sets up a new Special Administrative 
Unit for Attention and Reparations for Victims 
which is responsible for registering victims, 
providing reparations, and ensuring overall 
attention to victims, including their rights to 
truth, justice and nonrepetition. The Victims’ 
Unit coordinates the range of services to victims 
from a host of government agencies.
All victims should register in the Unified Victims’ 
Registry within four years of the law’s June 
2011 start date, and those victimized since the 
law’s start must register within two years of the 
abuse.30
Land restitution. The law’s major impact is in 
land restitution. The law sets up a Land Unit, or 
Special Administrative Unit for Land Restitution, 
and creates a registry of stolen land. Once a 
victim files a claim for land return, the Land 
Unit has 60 days to decide whether to include it 
in the registry.
The Land Unit then works with the victims to 
carry out topographical analysis of the land and 
prepare documentation. This is provided to land 
restitution judges who are to rapidly decide the 
case, if there are no opposing claims. Anyone 
asserting that they legitimately own the land 
that the victim is claiming has 15 days to file a 
counterclaim.
Where there are people presenting counterclaims 
(opositores), the judges prepare the case and 
send on to land magistrates who conduct further 
investigation and rule on the claim’s merits. 
Magistrates have four months to issue a decision.
Where victims’ claims are ruled valid, the judges 
or magistrates then order INCODER, the land 
tenure agency, to issue a title where needed and 
to revoke titles where land sales were forced. 
But their scope of action does not stop there: 
judges or magistrates have the authority to order 
government agencies to provide services so that 
the displaced victims can safely return, and can 
continue to monitor their situation and issue 
orders after returns.31
When judges rule that someone acquired land in 
good faith, but it had previously been obtained 
by violence, the good faith occupant will be 
compensated.
The law spells out how victims should 
receive land restitution even where ordinary, 
nontransitional justice would indicate otherwise. 
First, the law does not require victims to have 
land titles in order to be restituted. Many 
displaced persons occupied and farmed land for 
years, decades, and in the case of indigenous 
and Afro-Colombian communities, even 
centuries, without land titles. Second, the law 
recognizes that many families were forced to 
sell their lands at low cost under threat. In the 
most blatant cases, farmers were told to “sell 
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or we will buy from your widow,” but a general 
situation of violence or targeted killings could 
also send a terrifying message to farmers that 
they had to sell to those who offered to buy 
land at steep discount. According to the Victims’ 
Law, a situation of generalized violence, the 
existence of multiple land sales under market 
cost, and rapid expansion of monocrops, 
cattle ranching or industrial mining in a given 
area should be used to identify whether those 
applying for restitution had been forced to sell.
Compensation rather than land restitution is 
only provided where restitution is not possible. 
However, displaced persons can choose to sell 
their land after two years.
The Defense Ministry and the Land Unit 
determine in which areas the law will be carried 
out according to where security permits and 
displacement was extensive. Currently, the 
areas are Catatumbo, Cauca, Valle de Cauca, 
Magdalena Medio, Magdalena, Cesar, Montes 
de María, Nariño, Putumayo, south Córdoba, 
Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, Antioquia, south Meta, 
Tolima and Urabá. Within these larger areas, 
certain micro-zones are established as priorities. 
Once land is slated for return, farmers receive 
a certain amount of funding in a bank account 
which can be released for the productive project 
of their choice.
Women. The law protects women’s land rights 
by ensuring that women who were married to or 
living with men at the time of displacement will 
be receive land restitution, and that titles will be 
issued in the name of both individuals. 
Indigenous and Afro-Colombian victims’ 
Decrees. As the law was being debated, 
indigenous and Afro-Colombian organizations 
objected that they had the right to prior 
consultation under ILO convention 169. As a 
result, as the Victims’ Law was passed, the 
Colombian Congress granted the President 
the authority to subsequently negotiate two 
decrees with the status of law with indigenous 
and Afro-Colombian communities. These 
“decree laws” adapt the Victims’ Law to these 
two important groups.
The indigenous decree, Decree 4633 of 
2011, has several noteworthy distinctions 
from the Victims’ Law. First, it prioritizes 
collective reparations, and provides for 
collective reparations funds to be determined 
and administered by indigenous authorities. 
Strengthening collective organization is seen 
as a vital aspect of reparations. Second, it 
spells out how the state is supposed to protect 
indigenous territory, including how the armed 
forces should respect indigenous communities’ 
land rights and human rights, and calls for 
military and civilian authorities to receive 
training on such rights. Third, it recognizes that 
the earth itself can be a victim, and has more 
attention to environmental issues, although 
in practice this emphasis may be more 
rhetorical than real. Fourth, land can never 
be compensated monetarily; if land cannot be 
returned, similar land must be provided.
The Afro-Colombian decree, Decree 4635 of 
2011, also places a priority upon collective 
reparations, calling for a Comprehensive Plan 
for Collective Reparations to be prepared in 
consultation with communities. It emphasizes 
the importance of fully implementing Law 70, 
which recognized the right of Afro-Colombian 
communities to their territories. Victims 
of racial discrimination and environmental 
damage are recognized as victims, although 
mechanisms to make this operational are 
not spelled out. Finally, preservation of 
Afro-Colombian culture and tradition is a 
consistent refrain throughout the decree. 
Although the decree does elevate some 
important issues, many Afro-Colombian 
leaders feel it was not adequately consulted, 
with workshops that explained the draft law 
rather than serious consultation and a draft 
law presented by a range of Afro-Colombian 
organizations being ignored. An important 
substantive critique is that the reparation 
measures mandated by the Victims’ Law are 
in some ways more limited and less specific 
than the measures mandated by Constitutional 
Court order 005 regarding the Colombian 
government’s responsibilities to Afro-Colombian 
victims of displacement.32
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victims’ Participation. At a local and regional 
level, Transitional Justice Committees are 
established, led by mayors and governors with 
local government and victims’ participation, to 
guide implementation of the law at the local 
level. Victims’ Roundtables are supposed to be 
set up to provide oversight and channel input.
Flaws in the Law
A major objection to the law is that it 
could exclude victims of the Bacrim, the 
rearmed, regrouped or never demobilized 
paramilitary groups, such as the Black Eagles 
and Rastrojos. The government calls these 
“criminal bands,” insisting that they are 
no longer illegal armed groups, but rather 
ordinary criminals. As these groups are a 
driving source of violence, this could exclude 
significant numbers of victims. However, the 
Constitutional Court ruled that this exclusion 
was unconstitutional. While in theory the 
law is being adapted to address this gap, in 
practice many victims of Bacrim have been 
excluded from the registry of victims.
Another potential flaw concerns development 
projects implemented while a victim is 
displaced. Paramilitary groups, landowners, 
ranchers and extractive industries used violence 
to displace people in order to expand African 
palm plantations, cattle ranches, mining 
operations and other large-scale economic 
projects. Provision 99 of the Victims’ Law 
establishes that when an agroindustrial project 
was developed on land to be returned, good 
faith occupants can continue to operate the 
project and create a contract to provide benefits 
to the people who were displaced. Where the 
occupants were involved in the violence, the 
Land Unit will determine who will administer 
the project and ensure victims are benefitted. 
There is much to be concerned about here: the 
vagueness of this clause, the prioritization of 
agroindustrial projects over land return, and 
the potential for placing displaced persons in 
still dangerous situations where agroindustrial 
interests have an incentive to continue 
pressuring them.
A third problem is the vagueness of many 
sections regarding government services, which 
may be provided, but are not mandated.
Finally, the Victims’ Law is really about 
reparations and land restitution. It offers 
rhetoric, but little new in order to operationalize 
truth, justice and guarantees of nonrepetition. 
Even if it were perfectly implemented, it covers 
only one part of victims’ just demands.
However, the Victims’ Law makes a historic 
advance by putting Colombia’s victims of 
violence at the center of national debate, and 
offering a route forward for reparations and land 
restitution. As such, the primary challenge is not 
this rather beautiful and innovative law itself, 
but its implementation. 
 
Endnotes
 1  Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras y sus Decretos 
Reglamentarios,” Introducción, p. 13.
 2  Forjando Futuros, “Primeros Sentencias de Restitución de Tierras,” 
Semana, 3 de octubre 2013, http://www.semana.com/especial-
comercial-multimedia/multimedia/primeras-sentencias-de-restitucion-
de-tierras/357882-3.
 3  Contraloría General de la República, Defensoría del Pueblo, 
Procuraduría General de la Nación, Decretos ley de víctimas 
indigenas, negras, afrocolombianas, palenqueras, raizales y rrom, 






 4  Ibid, p. 31.
 5  Forjando Futuros, “Primeros Sentencias de Restitución de Tierras,” 
Semana, 3 de octubre 2013, http://www.semana.com/especial-
comercial-multimedia/multimedia/primeras-sentencias-de-restitucion-
de-tierras/357882-3.
 6  INCODER, table, “Hectares formalizadas y adjudicadas, desde agosto 
de 2013, Fecha reporte: 30 de septiembre de 2013. 
 7  All figures in this paragraph are from Human Rights Watch, The Risk 
of Returning Home: Violence and Threats against Displaced Persons 
Reclaiming Land in Colombia, September 2013, http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2013/09/17/risk-returning-home-0 .
 8  Ibid, p. 14. 
 9  Ibid, p. 14. 
10  Information from LWR/LAWGEF interviews as well as from Verdad 
Abierta, “Pitalito, Cesar, una vereda entre el despojo y el desalojo,” 9 
de julio de 2013, http://www.verdadabierta.com/despojo-de-tierras/
rearmados/component/content/article/48-despojo-de-tierras/4660-
pitalito-cesar-una-vereda-entre-el-despojo-y-el-desalojo/. Display 
quote from Verdad Abierta article.
11  “False positives”: victims of extrajudicial execution.
12  256,000 people were displaced in 2012, according to CODHES, 
the Consultancy for Displacement and Human Rights. The Victims’ 
Unit stated that 127,714 people were displaced in 2012, as of June 
2013 figures. The government registers displacement when people 
file for assistance, and the CODHES and government figures tend to 
grow closer considerably after the close of a year.
28	 Far	from	the	Promised	Land
Latin America Working Group education Fund




© 2013 by Latin America Working Group Education Fund and Lutheran World Relief







Acknowledgments: We thank Ricardo Sabogal, head of the Land Unit, for graciously sharing his time and 
perspectives, and we thank the staff of the national and Cartagena Land Unit, Cartagena Victims’ Center, and 
other government officials who provided us with interviews and information. We thank experts from Corporación 
Jurídica Yira Castro and INDEPAZ for their helpful analysis. We are deeply grateful to Lutheran World Relief’s 
partners in the Caribbean coast región, including: Corporación Desarrollo Solidario (CDS), Fundación Infancia 
Feliz, Fundación para la Paz, los Derechos Humanos y la Democracia (FUNDEMOCRACIA), Programa de 
Desarrollo y Paz del Cesar, and Red Agenda Caribe. We especially thank the many brave representatives 
of victims’ associations, land rights’ organizations, human rights groups, campesino, Afro-Colombian and 
indigenous organizations who shared their challenges, fears and dreams with us. 
13  Alejandro Reyes Posadas with Liliana Duica Amaya. Guerreros y 
campesinos: el despojo de la tierra en Colombia. Buenos Aires: 
Grupo Editorial Norma, 2009. 




15  Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), 
“Colombia Rural: Razones para la esperanza,” 2011, http://
pnudcolombia.org/indh2011/, p. 47. 
16  Center for International Policy, Indepaz, MINGA and Washington 
Office on Latin America, Waiting for Consolidation: Monitoring 
Colombia’s U.S.-Aided Counterinsurgency and Development 
Program, February 2012, http://justf.org/blog/2012/02/01/new-
report-waiting-consolidation.
17  Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), 
“Colombia Rural: Razones para la esperanza,” 2011, http://
pnudcolombia.org/indh2011/, p. 7.
18  For a compelling analysis of the economic interests opposing 
restitution in Colombia, see ColombiaLand.org, Elusive Justice: 
The Struggle for Land and Life in Curvaradó and Jiguamiandó, 
June 2013, http://colombialand.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/
Elusive_Justice.pdf.
19  A U.S. multinational company allegedly used Colombian subsidiaries 
to buy almost 130,000 hectares of such land in southern Colombia 
(Vichada). “In Colombia, an Alleged American Land Grab Sets 
off a Political Storm,” John Otis, Time Magazine, July 10, 2013. 
“Colombian Ambassador to U.S. Resigns Amid Pressure Over Land 
Deals,” by Sara Schaefer Muñoz, Wall Street Journal, July 23, 
2013. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732382910
4578624643197499014.html.




21  Amnesty International, “Hacienda Bellacruz: Land, Violence and 
Paramilitary Power,” February 1, 1997, https://www.amnesty.org/
es/library/asset/AMR23/006/1997/es/b335f15c-eac0-11dd-b6f5-
3be39665bc30/amr230061997en.html.
22  “El régimen de terror sexual que impulso el ‘para’ ‘Juancho Prada’”, 
El Tiempo, 28 de abril 2013, http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/
ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-12767893.html; Verdad 
Abierta, Justicia y Paz, “Las otras masacres de Juancho Prada,” 31 
de octubre de 2011, http://monitorias.com/justicia-y-paz/3625.
23  Amnesty International, “Hacienda Bellacruz: Land, Violence and 
Paramilitary Power,” February 1, 1997, https://www.amnesty.org/
es/library/asset/AMR23/006/1997/es/b335f15c-eac0-11dd-b6f5-
3be39665bc30/amr230061997en.html.
24  Víctor Manuel Vargas, “En firme, extradicción de ex ministro 
Marulanda,” El Tiempo, 21 de septiembre 2002, http://www.
eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1338760. 
25  Verdad Abierta, “La tierra no violó los derechos humanos,” http://
www.verdadabierta.com/despojo-de-tierras/3529-la-tierra-no-violo-
los-derechos-humanos.
26  Cited in Human Rights Watch, The Risk of Returning Home: 
Violence and Threats against Displaced Persons Reclaiming Land in 
Colombia, September 2013, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/09/17/
risk-returning-home-0 , p. 8.
27  Edwar Cobos Téllez, aka ‘Diego Vecino’ and Úber Bánquez Martínez, 
aka ‘Juancho Dique.’
28  Gustavo Emilio Balanta Castilla, “Pura Boquilla,” Vamos a Andar 
Cartagena, 24 agosto 2013.
29  See letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton from U.S. 
humanitarian, human rights, policy, grassroots and faith-based 
organizations, November 1, 2011, http://www.lawg.org/storage/
documents/Annual%20Reports/Clinton_Land_Rights_Letter_
Nov_2011_english.pdf.
30  Victims already registered in the pre-existing Unified Registry of 
Displaced Persons [Registro Único de Población Desplazada] are 
supposed to be automatically included in the new registry.
31  Article 102. “After issuing a sentence, the judge or magistrate will 
maintain his/her jurisdiction of the case in order to issue all those 
measures that, according to the case, may be necessary to guarantee 
the use, enjoyment and disposition of the possessions on the part of 
those displaced persons who have been restituted or who have had 
their land formally titled, and [to guarantee] the security for their 
lives, their personal integrity and that of their families.” [Articulo 
102. Después de dictar sentencia, el Juez o Magistrado mantendrá 
su competencia sobre el proceso para dictar todas aquellas mediada 
que, según fuere el caso, garanticen el uso, goce y disposición de 
los bienes por parte de los despojados a quienes les hayan sido 
restituidos o formalizados predios, y la seguridad para sus vidas, su 
integridad personal, y la de sus familias.”]
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Restitución de Tierras 1448 de 2011, Decreta Ley 4635 de 2011 
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Humanitaria Afrocolombiana, abril de 2013. http://www.choco.org/
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